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The tidelands law of the United States has evolved
sporadically . As the nation's population pressures have
increased, and every conceivable type of development has
attempted to locate in the coastal zone (1), the regulation
of tidelands has become increasingly stringent. No longer
can a private party fill an acre of tidelands on whim. In
the past, however, unauthorized tideland development was a
frequent occurrence . Thus current state governments must
deal with a legacy of improperly rilled tidelands. This
paper will examin~ some of the states' attempts to address
the problem of illegally improved tidelands.
OVERVIEW
The unique value of the ocean and its shores have been
recognized throughout history. so that different laws have
been applied to these areas than to their adJoining uplands.
This differential treatment can be traced back to Roman
times, where it was held that the rivers, the sea and its
shores could not be privately owned (2). In the words of
the Institutes of Justinian, these resources were "'common
to all,lI (3).
With the decline of the Roman Empire came an erosion of
the public ownership of tidelands (4)' By the Dark Ages,
the ' En g l i s h Crown claimed private ownership of all shores of
seas and navigable rivers within the ebb and flow of the
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tide, as well as an exclusive right to fish these areas (~).
The King, in turn, granted this right of private ownership
and use of the English shores to favored subJects (6),
As these private grants proliferated, the populace
protested (7). The public's dissatisfaction with the
Crown's absolute power to dispose of river and shore rights
was partially responsible for the signing of the Magna
Charta by the Crown in 1215 (8), The Magna Charta
subsequently was interpreted loosely by courts, forming the
basis for the common law theory (9) which divided the
Crown's claimed right so as to accommodate the interests of
both the King and his subJects in the lands belolJJ mean high
water (10). Under the theory, the Crown had two kinds of
interests in tidelands: a...lJ:!....§.. privatum, or private
ownership interest, and · a ..lJ:!.§. publicum, or public interest
(11). The ~ pubiicum provided that the king held the
common rights of navigation and fishing in his soverign
capacity as a representative of the people in pUblic trust
for all his subjects (12). Thus the Crown could not
transfer this latter interest into private hands (13)'
Eventually the theory evolved so as to place the ~
publicum under the control of Parliament, while the .J..Y...a
privatum remained with the King (14),
Since neither Parliament nor the King held all rights
to the tidelands, neither could convey clear title to such
lands to private individuals (5) . 'As a consequence, when
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the Crown transferred its ~ privatum to other individuals,
their interest always remained subject to the ~ pUblicum,
the public rights of fishing and navigation (16) . Only
Parliament, as the public's representative, could convey the
~ publicum (17).
In the days of the American colonies, it was
inconceivable that there might be insufficient coastline to
accommodate everyone. Settlers concentrated on fostering
commerce and industry--constructing wharves, docks and piers
on tidelands and filling coastal lands as they saw fit (18).
Despite the fact that the pUblic held an interest in
tidelands. this pUblic trust was often subordinated to
private uses by private developers.
Once the former colonies became independent. they
succeeded to the tideland rights previously held by the
Crown and Parliament (19)' The legislature of these states,
as the representatives of the pUblic, were endowed with the
authority to restrict and regulate the exerise of both the
~ privatum and ~ publicum (20), The manner in which
each state treated its tidelands varied. depending upon its
own particular needs. The usual practice was to grant
riparian land owners, owners of waterfront property. a
preferred right in the adjacent tidelands (21). This right
could consist of a license to use the property or even give
title to the land, depending on the state. Riparian
landowners continued the pre-Revolution process of improving
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and filling tidelands as their personal necessities
dictated.
As coastal development pressures began to increase. and
the value of the coastal zone became apparent. successively
more rigorous statutory schemes were enacted by state
legislatures to regUlate tidelands use (22). Nevertheless.
the early laws were not strictly enforced, and unautho r.ized
improvement of tidelands continued.
It was not until the latter half of this century that
state regulators really began to become concerned with the
illegal filling of, and erection of structures over
tidelands (23). The officials were faced with the problem
of what to do about tidelands which had been developed
without the appropriate state authority . The situation
presented a unique conflict between public and private
interests . The historic public trust in tidelands was
pitted against private landholders who, at times,
unwittingly had purchased buildings erected on unlawfUlly
developed tidelands.
The states had a choice. They could retain the status
quo by doing nothing . Or they could attempt to identify the
improperly filled lands, an enormous task possibly requiring
the ascertainment o~ the state's high tide line in colonial
times in order to document claims to property now
constituting illegal upland. If the state then discovered
improperly developed land. for instance, tidelands which
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which now had a house standing upon them, it was presented
wit had i 1emma. The state could allow the house to remain,
or it could attempt to return the land to its
pre-development status by requiring the removal of the
dwelling and subsequent excavation of the land . If the
state decided to let the house stand, it could deed the
underlying public property to the private party ror a price
or gratis, lease the property to the party, or do nothing.
Just as the states historically have dealt with the
pUblic and private rights in their tidelands differently,
the states which have addressed this problem have come up
with var~n solutions.
\ .......
This paper will examine the
treatment given unlaWfully improved tidelands in three
states along the North Atlantic seaboard: New Jers ey,
Massachusetts and Maine. Its discussion will be restricted
to those improperly developed tidelands which are located
tietween the high and low water lines, concentrating on
developments which have been in existence for a substantial
1ength of time.
The Northeast was selected as an area of study because
all the coastal states in this region were, at one time,
part of the British Empire. Thus these states' interest in
tidelands are rooted in the same tradition, making their
subse~uent treatment Or tidelands more comparable than would
otherwise be the case . The particular states examined
demonstrate a broad range of statutory solutions to illegal
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development of long-standing tenure. For instance, New
Jersey has elected to assert its claim to filled tidelands,
and after identifying the improperly developed lands for
which a state grant ~as never obtained, has decided to sell
those developed lands to their present occupants (24)'
Massachusetts, in contrast, apparently does not plan to sell
its affected tidelands, nor has it launched a full-scale
effort to identify them . Instead it hopes to locate some of
the illegally developed land through a recently enacted
amendment to its licensing statute, then assessing these
parties the back fees they would have paid if their
improvements had been properly licensed (25). Even with the
proper authorization, a license to develop in Massachusetts
is subject to revocation at any time by the legislature
(26), Maine has taken an entirely different approach to
improperly filled tidelands, releasing all public interest
in tidelands which were filled before 1976 to their "owners"
(27) .
This paper will analyze each state's tideland law
separately (28). The legal status of the state's tidelands
will be traced from colonial times. An historical approach
is necessary because the tideland law of no two states has
evolved identically. The legal heritage of each statel
combined with its social and economic development to produce
its own unique combination of common and statutory law (29).
Care will be taken in examining each state to discuss its
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most recent attempts to find a palatable solution to the
problem of illegally developed tidelands of long standing.
The discussion will conclude with a summary of the current
status of developed tidelands in the state.
Once the states have .be e n examined individually, their
treatment of illegally improved tidelands will be compared
(30) . Some uniform considerations involved in resolving
tidelands issues will be extracted (31), Recommendations
ror future state treatment of illegally filled tidelands
will bema d e (32 ) .
Some preliminary definitions of terminolgy is reqUired
before embarking on this endeavor. as coastal law is frought
with words meaning different things to different people . As
used herein, "tidelands" encompasse'S the land'S between the
high and low water marks. which are periodically SUbmerged
b y the tid e 5 ( 33 >. "Tid a 1 f I a t 5" W ill d e 5 i gnat e tho s e
tidelands between the high and low water marks or one
hundred rods (34) from th~ high water mark. whichever is
less . The "one hundred rod lands" refers to those tidelands
above the low water mark. but over one hundred rods below
high water . "Submerged lands" generally will be used to
designate the lands below the low water line which are
constantly covered by water, except where specific note is
made that the term is meant to include the one hundred rod
I and s • as we 11.
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LEGAL TREATMENT OF TIDELANDS DEVELOPMENT
New Jersey
Since New Jersey was one of the original thirteen
states. its .p e o p l e were vested with all the Crown's rights
to New Jersey's tidelands after the American Revolution
(35) . The attitude of the state towards these lands is best
summarized by the court in Bailey y..:... Driscoll (36). There
the New ~ersey Superior Court. as affirmed by the New ~ersey
Supreme Court, held that each state exercises the sovereign
perogative of ownership over its own tidelands. and thus may
deal with them accordingly to its own views of Justice and
fairness (37). According to the court. a state may reserve
control over its tidelands to itself, or grant these rights
to private individuals or corporations. as it deems is in
the public's best interests (38)'
Prior to 1851, the State of New ~ersey exerted no
general supervision or control over its tidelands (39)' The
accepted custom of the state was that an owner of riparian
lands could expand his holdings down to the low water mark
by making improvements upon the tidally-washed lands
adJoining his property (40) . Thus if an upland owner built
a wharf or filled land adjacent to his propert~ from the
high to the low water marks. title to that land became
vested in him in fee simple absolute (41)' Before any
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improvements were made to the tidelands, however, the
riparian owner had no property right in this area; he
merely held a license to improve which was revocable by the
state (42)' The Wharf Act of 1851 (43) codified this common
law custom (44).
The Wharf Act subsequently was repealed, and the prior
local custom terminated as to some of New Jersey's tidelands
in 1869 (45), and as to the remainder in 1891 (46). As
might be expected, under the language of the repealing
statute, riparian landowners who had built wharves or filled
tidelands prior to 1869 or 1891, whichever was the relevant
date for the area, retained title to the affected property
(47). Where this license to artificially appropriate the
tidelands had not been exercised, however, it was revoked by
the state; thesE' latter tidelands remained the state's
pro per t y ( 48 >.
The repealing statute provided that any future
acqUisition of, filling in or wharfing out upon tidelands
must be authorized by the Riparian Commissioners, who were
empowered to lease or grant the tidelands to private parties
(49)' These commissioners initially were very lax, often
selling or leasing tidal flats for inadequate amounts in
perpetuity (50)' Moreover, riparian landowners continued to
fill tidelands without state permission (51). As much of
the filling took place in the marshes and meadowlands, areas
then thought valueless, state authorities paid little
attention to the status of these lands (~2).
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Much of the
unauthorized private development or state land took place in
good faith, as it was very hard to determine the location of
the mean high tide line separating public and private
property (~3)'
With the growth in population, commerce and navigation
the tidelands became increasingly valuable (54), The
limited nature of the tidelands resource, along with citizen
interest in ensuring that the state was sufficiently
compensated ror the private appropriation of these lands
(55), combined to increase the stringency of review by the
state before leasing or granting tidal lands . New Jersey's
statutory requirement, dating from 1894 (56), that any money
received from the lease or sale of current or former
tidelands must be appropriated for the support o~ the
state's public schools (57), compelled great pUblic interest
in the tideland issue. In New Jersey. once money or
property has been appropriated to the permanent fund for the
support of free public schools, the State Constitution
prevents it from being put to any other use (58). Thus the
state cannot give away riparian property, even for pUblic
pur p 0 s e 5 (59) . While the school funds' principa l cannot be
. ;
used for any purpose, i(~~ interest accrues to support
public education (60).
It was not until 1959 that the State of New Jersey made
any real effort to bolster the school fund b~ asserting
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claim to the state's marsh and meadowlands (61), Up until
this time the tideland doctrine primarily had been used to
claim the shores bounding the state's rivers and the ocean
(62) . While such shores are relatively barren areas where
the mean high tide mark is clearly discernible, the marshes
and meadowlands are heavily vegetated, lOW-lying areas often
situated far from the water course, with the high tide mark
lost among the covering vegetation (83), Nevertheless. by
1961 the Superior Court of New Jersey recognized the state's
claim to thousands of acres of marsh and meadowland flowed
by the tide (64).
The decision that the state had a valid claim to
tidally-affected marsh and meadowlands caused tremendous
public concern (65). Citizens who held record title to
property in this area were concerned that the court's
holding would cloud title to their land. rendering it
unmarketable (66)' As a consequence, several study
commissions were formed to solve the conflict between the
states' reclamation efforts and private landowners' claims
(67), Their efforts primarily focused on the Hackensack
Meadowlands in northern New Jersey. the proposed site of a
new sports complex (68).
In addition. various legislative solutions were
introduced to address the overall problem (69). Among the
proposals were 1964 and 1965 bills that would have exempted
from claims of state ownership all record titles held by a
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property owner or his predecessor for the previous thirty
years which had been assessed taxes for the last twenty
(70), and a 1965 bill which p~oposed that the line
separating private and state land be moved from the mean
high to the mean low water mark (71). Both types of bills
received legislative approval) but never went into effect
because of a gubernatorial veto (72). Presumably the veto
was due to the constitutional question of whether the
legislature could give away lands that were dedicated to the
school fund <73>.
ConseQ.uently) in 1966 (74) and 1968 (75) legislative
resolutions proposed putting to a public referendum a
constitutional amendment providing for private ownership if
a history of record ownership and assessment for taxes was
shown. The proposals calling for amendment of the
Constitution seemed to solve the constitutional Q.uestions
raised by the earlier legislative bills . The 1966 and 1968
resolutions met a fate similar to their predecessorsl
however, so that the amendments were never submitted to the
electorate (76)' Detractors accused the amendments of being
inexcusable "give aways" of New Jersey's tidelands to
private interests (77).
One bill offered during the 1968 legislative term with
a tidelands orientation was successful, though. Senate Bill
477 was enacted in response to a suggestion made by the New
Jersey Supreme Court in a meadowlands dispute that "[aJs a
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matter of good housekeeping, the apprppriate officers of the
state should do what is feasible to catalogue the states'
farflung holdings ." (78) That law, which was codified as
Title 13 of the New 0ersey statutes (79), directed what is
now the Tidelands Resource Council of the Department of
Environmental Frotection (80) "to undertake title studies
and survey of meadowlands throughout the State and to
determine and certify those lands which it f[indsJ are
State-owned lands ." (81) The "meadowlands" SUbject to study
did not encompass all tidelands, but rather were limited by
definition to "those lands now or formerly consisting
chiefly of salt water swamps, meadows or marshes." (82) When
each meadowlands stUdy was complete, the Council was to
pUblish a map clearly deliniating the lands designated as
state-owned (83) .
Guidelines concerning which meadowlands were candidates
for state claims were given by the case spawning the
statutory scheme, O'Neill ~ State Highway Department (84).
In O'Neill, the Supreme Court of New Jersey held that the
state owns all lands which a pe tide-flowed up to the mean
high tide mark (85), as well as those lands formerly
tide-flowed where the riparian owner artifically excluded
the tide after the repeal or the Wharf Act without a grant
from the state (86) . Tidelands which had been granted to
private parties by the state, as well as lands appropriated
by riparian owners pursuant to local custom or the Wharf Act
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prior to its revocation in 1891, remained in private hands
(87).
In addition to setting forth the criteria for potential
state-owned tidelands, the O'Neill court appo~tioned the
burden of proof of establishing the tidal or nontidal
character of lands between the .s t a t e and private entities .
The court stated that the party claiming that the tideland
status of its property is different from what it presently
appears has the burden of showing that the property's status
was changed by artificial means (B8), Thus if a particular
piece of nontidal property was claimed by both the state and
a private entity, the state must demonstrate that this
property is former tidelands which were artificially
appropriated (89)'
The maps to be produced under the statutory mandate of
Title 13 merely set forth the state's claims, but were not
intended to resolve the title question (90). Rather the
enactment was meant to allow persons belieVing that the
status of their meadowlands was inaccurate as mapped to
require the Council to review its determination (91).
Aggrieved parties also were given the right to initiate a
quiet title suit against the state (92).
Although Title 13 mandated the state scrutinize only
meadowlands. the State Department of Environmental
Protection decided to research all the tidelands in which
the ~tate might have an interest (93) . This was in part
,
,
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because the O'Neill decision gave notice to both the state
and private occupants of land fronting the ocean and its
tributaries of the possibile state interest in these lands
(94). In the late 1970's, the state especially began to
consider the possibility that owned " the increasingly
valuable lands around the new Atlantic City casinos (95).
In order to avoid the lengthy delays that could be involved
if a title dispute were to arise, at least five casino
developers paid a total of five and one-half million dollars
to the state in "nonrefundable considerations" to ensure
that title to their land would remain clear of future state
claims (96)' In most cases, these potential claims never
act ua 11 y ar 05 e (97).
Once the state laid claim to the c e s i no v Land s , it was
obvious that it eventually would have to pursue claims
against private homeowners (98). Uncertainty as to the
legal ownership of riparian properties was rampant, because
if the upland status of the property was created by an
impermissible method, the lands might belong to the state
(99) . Moreover. if a property had been conveyed several
times since the improvement of the riparian land, it was
nearly impossible for the present owner to discern whether
the state could make a bona fide claim to his land (100).
To bring some legislative relief to the riparian
homeowners of southern New Jersey and to expedite casino
claims, a legislative initiative was introduced in 1981 to
PAGE 17
relinquish state claims in an~ property that had not been
tidal within the preceding forty years (101), Because the
proposal would bar state claims to former tidelands with a
given history, and the proceeds from the sale of these lands
had been constitutionally "d e d i c a t e d to the public schools.
the legislature believed a constitutional amendment was
nee d e d (1 02 ) .
The amendment applied to both meadowland and
nonmeadowland property that was formerly, but not currently.
tidally flowed (103)' It specifically provided that the
state. could not claim lands whic~ ~ad not been washed by the
tides within a forty year time period unless the state
"specifically defined and asserted" its claims to the land
within that forty years (104). To allow for the fact that
some formerly tidal property would have been filled for more
than forty years before the amendment's adoption, the
amendment was SUbsequently revised to allow the state one
year from its passage to define and assert state claims to
these tidelands (105).
The amendment alone deprived the state of nothing
(106). When adopted. the state would own exactly what it
did before . The amendment simply re~uired the state to make
its claim to former tidelands within a specified period
(107). The legislature intended to give the private
landowner only the relief of knowing whether the state
claimed his property (108) . The landowner then could
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challenge the decision administratively or Judicially (109),
or attempt to obtain a grant of the land from the state
(110)'
The relative merits of the amendment was a subJect of
heated public debate, with opponents including Governor
Byrne and his administration (111). Nevertheless,
three-fifths of the legislature agreed to submit the
initiative to the people of the state (112). The debate
concerning the proposed amendment continued, with some
people characterizing the amendment as a "giveaway" (113) .
Two lawsuits relating to the amendment were filed before the
balloting (114). One suit dealt with the wording of the
interpretive statement which was to be placed on the ballot
with the amendment (115), while the other challenged the
amendment's constitutionality and subsequent interpretation
(116).
The amendment was adopted by a slight majority of New
Jer.sey citizens on November 3, 1981 (117). Because the
amendment allowed the state only one year to "specifically
define and assert [its] claim" to former tidelands which had
not been tidally flowed within the preceding forty years
(118), and all but four of New Jersey's twenty-one counties
contained some form of tidelands (119), the time pressures
on the state were enormous. How a claim had to be
"specifically defined and asserted" was thus important.
Since the amendment itself did not define this terminology,
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it was left to the state's courts.
The New Jersey Supreme Court ruled in 1983 that all the
amendment required for a valid claim was that the state
declare its claim in good faith and notify any adversely
affected property owner (120). No specific procedure had to
be followed (121). As of November 1982, when ·t h e one-year
grace period for claiming lands not tidally flowed in the
past forty years had expired, the court found the state had
properly defined and asserted its claim to 150,000 acres of
land (122) along the New Jersey coast from New York City to
Cape May (123). The state did not meet the requisite
standard when it made more generalized claims to 77,000
acres (124) along the Delaware Bay and River from Cape May
to Trenton, New Jersey (125). As a result of the court's
decision, the state lost any potential claim to areas not
tidally flowed since November of 1941 in the Delaware tidal
region. a loss characterized as "limited ll by the court
( 126) .
Once the constitutional amendment was passed many
riparian homeowners felt the dilemma of competing state
claims to their land was allowed (127). But with the
state's filing of numerous claims along the Atlantic coast,
it was clear that they were wrong, and that the ownership of
a substantial amount of property was in dispute (128),
Opinions varied as to the potential cost · to such
homeowners of clearing the title to their land. According
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to Save the School Fund, a group opposing the amendment, the
average cost of the 226 state grants issued to homeowners
between 1971 and 1981 was not prohibitively
expensive--S1,685 (129). Another source came up with a
similar average, stating that fifty-one percent of these
claims were settled for $1,000 or less (130). But the
common understanding was that in order for a property owner
to rid his title of a state claim. he had to buy a riparian
grant from the State of New Jersey, paying the current fair
market value of the disputed land plus any improvements
thereon (131), Thus if the land in ques~ion contained a
house, it was believed that the homeowner, in effect. had to
repurchase his house at current prices (132) . Whil ·e the
cost to some homeowners would be covered by their title
insurance policies. many policies exce~ted state claims from
coverage (133). Clear title is mandatory if a riparian
owner wants to sell his land, as naone will buy it while a
state claim is pending (134).
In order to avoid penalizing persons who bought
riparian property never suspecting it was improperly filled.
a second initiative was introduced in the legislature in
1982 (135)' This initiative proposed balloting on an
amendment to the State Constitution which would empower the
legislature to pass laws setting the compensation rate that
a property owner would have to pay to clear title to his
land (136). Under the proposaL the compensation foT'
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riparian lands could be "less than the Pair market value o~
the state's interest, or nominal, "(137) although the state
would not be reqUired to accept a reduced price (138), The
amendment proposed to allow the legislative scheme to
differentiate between properties used for different
purposes, i. e. between commerciaL municipal and
re.sidential properties (139) ,
The legislature unanimously approved putting the second
referendum on the ballot (140) , Despite having the support
of Governor ·Kea n and his administration, a well as the
majority of the state legislators (141), New Jersey voters
reJected the proposal by a three to two margin in November
of 1982 (142)' The defeat was at least partially due to an
extensive lobbying effort by Save the School Fund, which
claimed that millions of dollars would be lost if the
amendment was adopted (143).
After the rejection of the 1982 amendment, the state
declared that it would not evict residents on property
claimed by the state (144) because it did not want to eJect
good faith buyers who never realized they were purchasing
former tidelands (145), Thus the state has not actively
pursued its claims. and could not even if it so desired,
since the Department of Environmental Protection has
insufficient manpower to follow through on each property
claim (146). Homeowners who want to sell their land,
however, still must obtain clear title. since it is
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unmarketable in its present state (147).
These people can choose one of two ways to clear their
title. One possibility is to bring a quiet title action
against the state, thus forcing the state to prove its claim
to the land. It appears this course of action has a good
chance of success, since the state would have the burden of
proving the former tidal condition of the land from old
records not designed to document riparian claims (148) .
Moreover, in the past the state has not done well in
riparian litigation (149). This option, however, takes a
substantial amount of time and money. both of which may be
at a premium for a potential seller.
The other alternative is for the homeowner to buy a
riparian grant from the state. This has been the preferred
method for clearing title to date (150)' The homeowner
applies for a grant from the Tidelands Resource Board.
Although the approval of the Board. the Commissioner of
Environmental Protection and the Governer is required for
the grant to be made (151), authorization is usually given
for good faith purchasers of filled land (152). If the
householder successfully shows that he bought his land in
good faith before the state asserted its claim, he pays a
"nominal flee" for the grant--twenty-five percent of its
appraised fair market value (153). Industrial, commercial
and municipal riparian owners go through the same procedure
( 154). Thus it seems that although the 1982 referendum was
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defeated, it lives on in the form of reduced prices for
riparian grants to "good faith" upland owners.
As for the school fund. on October of 1982 it totalled
thirty-eight million dollars (155), with an average annual
increase of about two million dollars between 1976 and 1981
being due to the sale and lease of tidelands (156) , The
size of the fund has been increasing more rapidly since the
state's assertion of its tidelands claims (157). Because
under the state's constitution the fund's principal can not
be touched (158), it seems unlikely that enough time has
passed for the interest attributable to recently sold
tidelands to make a dent in New Jersey's two billion dollar
annual budget for school aid (159) .
To summarize the current status of New Jersey
tidelands, if a person lives on apparent upland in New
Jersey which has not been washed by the tide in the past
forty years, nor properly claimed by the state prior to
November of 1982 as former tidelands, he owns his property
outright (160). If. however. his apparent upland has either
been tidally flowed in the past forty years (161), or if not
so flowed has been appropriately claimed by the state prior
to November of 1982 as former tidelandsl the private party
will have to resolve the conflicting state claim prior to
selling his land (162). If the land a person claims as his
is currently washed by the tide. his claim to the property
is inval~d unless he can show one of two things: either
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that his predecessor in title artificially appropriated the
land by erecting a structure such as a wharf prior to 1869
or 1891, whichever is the relevant date for the area (163),
and such appropriation has continued to this day without an
unreasonably long interruption (164); or, that he holds a
lease . or grant 9f the land from the state (165).
Massachusetts
Like New Jerse~, the colonists of Massachusetts
received their rights in tidelands from the English Crown
(166), The property of the Crown in the Massachusetts area
originally was given to the companies chartered to settle
Plymouth and Massachusetts Eay colonies (167)' Since the
companies received no more interest in tidelands than the
Crown held, they could deed their ~ privatum in land below
mean high water to private parties, but retained the ~
publicum in trust for the public (168).
The new Massachusetts Eay Colony had different
requirements than the Crown and as early as the 1640's its
treatment of tidelands diverged from that of the colony that
became New Jersey. The Massachusetts colonists needed to
encourage commerce and navigation by building wharves, but
did not have the public funds for the endeavor (169)' Thus
the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 was passed to encourage
private shorefront development (170), It gave the riparian
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owner of l~nds adjoining tidally affected salt water
"propriety" over tidelands to the low water mark or one
hun dred rod s (171), whie heve r wa 5 1e S 5 (t hat is, pro pr i e t y
over the tidal flats (172», provided he did not interfere
with navigation (173). The rights given to the riparian
owner were subject to the same ~ publicum that was in
effect when the land was owned by the Crown--the public
rights of navigation. fishing and fowling (174).
Nevertheless, as long as the riparian owner did not
materially interfere with navigation, he could erect
structures over, or fill in, tidal -Flats (175), seemingllj
extinguishing the pUblic rights in the property (176),
Until such action was taken, the riparian ownership was
SUbject to the pUblic rights (177) .
When the independent province of Massachusetts was
;ormed, the rights of the trading companies in Massachusetts
tidelands passed to the province (178), and subsequently to
the Commonwealth of Massachusetts. Riparian owners
throughout the commonwealth continued to enJoy the rights
given them by the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 (179) ,
Wharves sprang up alon g the waterfront and increasing
amounts of tidelands were reclaimed (180). By the early
1800's, the common practice of the commonwealth legislature
was to grant wharfing privileges to va~ious companies so
they could extend structures over the tidal flats onto
submerged lands (181). The development pressures were
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especially great in Boston Harbor (182),
By the mid-1800's. investors who had speculated in
harbor property attempted to capitalize on their investment
by pressuring the legislature to grant the commonwealth's
~lats to private owners (183), Their lobbying efforts
backfired. resulting in the creation of a permanent Board of
Harbor Commissioners in 1866. whose approval was required
for any proposed development of tidelands (184). In
addition, the board was empowered to lease tidelands
belonging to the commonwealth (185). Provision was made to
require compensation by parties which displaced tidewater by
locating any structure below the high water mark or filling
the tidal flats (186) . The compensation was either in the
Torm of an excavation by the party of a basin elsewhere in
the harbor's tidelands to allow an equivalent amount of
water to gather as the development had displaced, or payment
in lieu of excavation (187)' The latter was apparently the
more common practice (18S), The legislature also declared
that any unauthorized development which took place belo~ the
high water mark was a public nuisance. and empowered the
commonwealth to institute a lawsuit to enjoin or remove the
n u i san c e (1 89 ) .
In 1869 the legislature declared that all authority or
license granted from that day forward to build on. fill in
or enclose tidelands was "revocable at any time, at the
discretion of the legislature. "(190) This license expired
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if not used within five years of its issuance (191) : By
1874, the legislature required compensation in addition to
the tidewater displacement charge if a private party was
granted license to build over or fill in tidelands to which
the commonwealth held title (192) . Presumabl~ the statute
encompassed submerged lands, including the one hundred rod
I and sCI 93 ) .
Despite the requirement that one had to obtain a
license before developing any tidelands after 1866,
unauthorized development continued (194). The status of
these filled and altered tidelands was unclear. Although
they were deeded from one private party to another. the
commonwealth arguably retained an interest in them by virtue
of the public trust impressed upon them, especially if they
were commonwealth lands for which no compensation was paid.
The title uncertainties peaked in 1979. This was when
the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court was presented with
the question of who owned the land underlying a Boston
Harbor wharf which had been erected under the auspices of an
1832 legislative enactment (195). Earlier in the century
the court had decided that pre-1869 enactments authorizing
development were grants of the land. rather than revocable
licenses like their successors (196). In Boston Waterfront
Development Corporation ~ Commonwealth (197), however, the
?upreme Judicial Court determined that. at least as to lands
below the historic law waterline. enactments which did not
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expressly and unequivocably state that all the public's
interest in the lands was transferred, conve~ed less than
absolute title in the underlying land to private parti~s
(198)' Rather. such acts were grants of title "s ub j e c t to
the condition subsequent that it [the land] be used for the
public purpose for which it was granted. "(199) The court
believed this condition was imposed by virtue of the fact
that submerged lands are impressed with a public trust
( 200>'
The general understanding of a grant of title subJect
to such a condition subsequent is that if the land ever
-f a i l s .to be used for the condition imposed, title to the
property reverts back to its original owner (201)--here, the
commonwealth (202), A similar condition logically would be
imposed on the one hundred rods lands, since like the lands
below the low tide line. these tidelands were not subJect to
SUbject to the terms of Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 (203) .
The Boston Waterfront Devlopment decision did not alter
the status of filled tidal flats: the riparian owners still
held these lands subject to the pUblic rights of fishing,
fowling and navigation (204), and even those public rights
were arguably extingUished if a riparian owner built on his
flats so as to completely exclude the public without
unreasonably interfering with navigation (205),
Nevertheless, the decision raised questions in the minds of
many of the purported owners of filled tidelands. Thus
,----------- - ------ -------- - - - ---_...--- ------- - ----
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during both its 1980 (206) and 1981 terms the Massachusetts
legislatu~e conside~ed bills to clarify the title to filled
tidelands in Boston Harbor which were below the primitive
hi 9 h wa t er mar-k (207) .
The 1981 bill provided that no limitation was to be
implied, unless expressly stated. in legislative acts or
deeds by which the commonwealth purported to create rights
in waters and lands below the primitive high water mark in
Boston (208) . Apparently this provision was designed to
legislatively overrule the Boston Waterfront decision (209)-
The bill also declared that any tidelands lying landward of
the 111980 line" (a line drawn on a map of the Boston Harbor
area in 1980. landward of which was property that. in the
past had b~en tidal flats (210» which had been. or in the
future would be. filled pursuant to the express language of
a commonwealth enactment or grant was for a proper public
purpose. and any vestigial interest of the commonwealth in
such tidelands was eliminated (211). Thus the legislature
basically proposed that if any public interest did remain in
the lawfully filled tidal flats. these public rights were
al iminated (212)' As to land seaward of the 1980 line
<which consisted of former submerged lands (213»l the bill
provided that the decision as to whether the release o~ the
vestigial rights of the commonwealth would be in the pUblic
interest was to be made on a parcel by parcel basis by the
Executive Office of Environmental A~fairs (214) .
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Despite receiving a favorable advisory opinion from the
Supreme Judicial Court on the bill's constitutionality
(215), it was never enacted. Instead, a less radical
legislative scheme was passed in December of 1963 to
"immediately prOVide more comprehensive protection to the
Massachusetts coastline . "(216) The 1983 law essentially
modified tidelands statutes which were already in place.
The most noteworthy of the changes is one mandating that any
future license for tideland development must authorize a
specific use <217>'
Prior to the law's passage, a license for tidal
development was generic, 50 that the type of development
licensed could change without an update of the license
(218) . For example, if a person received approval to build
a wharf, he subse~uently could fill the underlying lands
without the knowledge or interference of the commonwealth.
Now "any change in use or substantial structural alteration
0; a licensed stucture OT" fill, Il req,1.!ires that one obtain a
new license from the Department of Environmental Quality
Engineering (219). regardless of when the original license
was issued (220)' As a result, the commonwealth will be
able to keep track of tidelands uses. If a developer does
not comply with the terms of his license, it can be revoked
<221>.
Another significant change is the inclusion of the
terms "commonwealth tidelands" and "private tidelands" in
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the tidelands statutes along with their definitions (222),
According to the Act. "commonwealth tidelands" refers to
both tidelands held by the commonwealth in trust for the
public, and tidelands held by some other party which arE'
subJect either to an express or an implied condition
swbsequent that they be used for a public purpose (223)--in
other words, the SUbmerged lands, presumably including the
one hundred rod lands . nprivate tidelands" is defined to
include tidelands held by a private party subJect to a
public easement for navigation, fishing and fowling
(224)--seemingly the tidal flats SUbJect to riparian
ownership under the Colonial Ordinance. The new enactment
provides that .i n order for a structure or fill to be
licensed upon either type of tidelands. it must be necessary
to accommodate a water dependent use, unless public hearings
are held and certain findings made (225). There is an
additional requirement that developments upon commonwealth
tidelands, even when furthering a water dependent use, must
serve a proper public purpose (226)'
By superimposing the most recent legislative treatment
of Massachusetts tidelands upon the former law, it seems one
can summarize the status of filled and othe~wise improved
tidelands as follows. Any riparian owner whose predecessor
in title erected structures upon or filled his tidal flats
prior to 1869 holds complete title to these lands (227).
Those whose predecessors developed submerged lands
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(including one hundred rod lands> during this time with
legislative authorization, but without receiving an express
grant of all the commonwealth's rights and interest in the
lands obtained, at best, title to the property s ub j e c t to
the condition that the land be used for the public purpose
for which it was granted (228). Any license granted after
1868 for the development of any tidelands. be they tidal
flats or SUbmerged lands, gives the licensee only a
revocable development right (229). This right expires if
not exercised within five years, and even if exercised, can
be withdrawn by the legislature at any time (230)-
Thus riparian owners may have "propriety" in their
adjacent tidal flats, but unless the flats were developed
before 1868, this entitlement remains subject to the public
trust. The pUblic interest seemingly may require that
post-IS6S development not occur at all. or if it is
authorized to take place, that the development later be
removed, giving way to the public rights of navigation,
fishing and fowling. How title to these flats would be
characterized is unclear., as is the title to unlawfully
developed flats. Title to submerged lands (including the
one hundred rod lands> developed after 1868 remains in the
commonwealth, with a license to d~velop being revocable at
an y tim e (231) .
As to those tidelands which were unlawfully filled or
improved after 1866, the improvements are considered b~ law
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to comprise a pUblic nuisance, and are subJect to legal
action to enjoin or abate them (232) . Practically speaking,
however, it is unlikely that the commonwealth will require
that long-time illegal improvements be removed (233)' To
begin with, it is improbable that long-term unlawful
development will be discovered, because of the
commonwealth's lack of personnel to trace such development
(234), If it is detected, it will probably be 'b e c a u s e the
private "owner" changes his use of the tideland, and thus
SUbjects himself to the relicensing requirements of the new
law (235). Once the illegal actiVity is discovered, the
worst that is likely to happen is that the developer will be
charged past assessments for tidewater displacement, as well
as an additional fee for the use of commonwealth lands, if
a p p 1 i cab I e ( 236 ) .
t1a i ne
Since Maine was part of the Commonwealth of
Massachusetts when Massachusetts became a state, it is not
surprising that the two state's tidelands law pursued a
similar course for a long time. Maine achieved statehood on
t1arch 15, 1820, when it separated from Massachusetts (237)-
Thus the pre-1820 statutory and common law of Maine is
identical to that of Massachusetts (238). For instance, the
Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47, although never enacted by the
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Maine legislature, has been adopted by the Maine courts as
part of its common law (239)' Hence the rights of' the
riparian landowner in Maine tidal flats has been
characterized as a qualified one--qualified by the public
rights of navigation, fishing and fowling (240). As long as
the tidelands remain in their natural state, the public has
the right to navigate. fish and fowl the overlying waters
(241) . These public rights are extinguished, however, once
the riparian owner encloses or fills in his adJacent flats,
as long as he does not unreasonably interfere with
navigation (242).
This is not the situation for the one hundred rod
lands, though . These tidelands were unaffected by the
Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 (243), and have been generally
treated like submerged lands (244)' Thus after the American
Revolution, the state retained both the ~ Dublicum and ~
privatum interests in the one hundred rod lands (245). As a
legal matter, they were not subJect to private appropriation
without state authorization (246),
While the state apparently has never given away or sold
any of its subme~ged lands below the low wate~ mark (247),
whether similar activity has taken place with regards to the
one hundred rod lands is less clear . It is known, howeve~,
that orten these lands were filled o~ built upon by private
parties without any conveyance or authorization by the
state, as were the nearshore tidal flats and the offshore
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submerged lands (248).
Prior to 1876, the riparian owner of tidal flats could
erect wharves upon the flats without any governmental
involvement, the only limitation being that he could not
materially interfere with navigation (249)' Legislative
license was required, though. to erect fishing wiers on
tidelands (250). Then in 1876 the Maine legislature enacted
a statute which dealt with the licensing of both wharves and
weirs (251), It required a potential developer to obtain a
public permit from the town prior to erecting either type of
structure on tidelands (252L Once a wharf was erected
under a valid license, it could not be ordered removed even
if it obstructed navigation (253), Without the license,
though, the Wharf was an unlawful structure (254) .
Nevertheless, private individuals often built wharves and
piers over these state tidelands after 1876 without the
re~uisite license (255).
Apparently it was not u~til 1967 that the filling of
tidelands was regulated . Prior to this time it was legal
for a riparian landowner to fill his adJacent flats under
the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 (256) without state
license. In contrast. since the lands seaward of the flats
(the one hundred rod and submerged lands) belong to the
state (257), they could not lawfully be filled without state
authorization, although they were filled (258L
The Wetlands Control Act of 1967 was passed to protect
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the public inte~est f~om the consequences of coastal wetland
alte~ation (259) . It ~equi~ed a ~ipa~ian Dwne~ to obtain
permission from the municipality and the Wetlands Control
Board before altering any land subJect to tidal action above
extreme low water (260). Thus the Act governed the filling
of and building upon both flats and one hundred rod lands.
Apparently it was believed initiall~ that since it was
unlawful to fill submerged lands, no license provision was
needed for this area. The provision governing coastal
wetlands have been amended a number of times since 1967, so
that it now applies to both tidal and subtidal (SUbmerged)
lands (261). Permits presently ane now granted by either
the Board of Environmental Protection or the town (262).
with their decision being based upon considerations such as
whether the activity will unreasonably interfere with
recreation or navigation, or will cause certain detrimental
environmental effects (263) .
Whether the state's tidal and submerged lands have been
developed legally or illegally, the responsible parties
generally Claimed ownership of the underlying land, as well
as the structures above (264), They used and conveyed the
lands as i~ they were their own, without paying any
consideration to the state or acknowledging the public's
interest in the land (265). Some of the most visible land
treated in this manner was the waterfront of the Portland
Harbor, a large part of which consists of filled land (266).
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In 1975, the Maine legislatu~e decided to reestablish
the state's rights to its sUbmerged and tidal lands.
Through the Submerged Lands Act of 1975 the legislature
authorized the Bureau of Public Lands within the Department
of Conservation (267). to lease the state's interest in
submerged (268) and intertidal lands (269) to private
parties (270)' The statute provided for a maximum lease
term of thirty years in order to enable these persons to
lawfully build upon and fill the lands (271). The
legislature allowed for no-cost easements for noncommercial,
recreational use by the upland owner, as well as for
operations occ~pying one hundred square feet or less of the
state tidelands, facilities relating to fish landing or
processing, and fedlHal harbor improvement pr o j e c bs (272) ,
The legislature also granted the owners of all structures
actu~lly upon the submerged and intertidal lands on the
effective date of the legislation a thirty year no-cost
easement to those lands (273). Since the term "intertidal
Lan d s ". as later defined. coincided exactly with the portion
of tidelands subJect to appropriation by riparian owners
under the Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47 (274), it is
~uestionable whether the state had any rights left to lease
in those intertidal lands which already had been f ·illed
(275) .
The leasing statute did not address the issues of
whether the public retained an interest in illegally filled
state lands and who "owned" these lands (276),
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These
concerns were brought into focus when neither the city of
Portland nor the Bath Iron Works could figure out from whom
to obtain ownership rights in order to develop former
tidelands (277), The result was the passage of further
leg is 1a t ion in 1981 (278 >.
The 1981 Act enactment released the state's pUblic
trust interest in SUbmerged and intertidal lands filled on
or before October I. 1975 (the effective date of Maine's
Submerged Lands Act) to the "owners" of these lands (279),
unless they had been filled since 1967 in violation of the
Wetlands Act (280). Although "owners" was not defined by
the Act, the term apparently refers to the parties who
filled the lands, and their successors in interest.
In order to grant away the public's trust interest in
former one hundred rod and submerged lands. the legislature
had to find the grant to be in the public interest (281).
In the first section of the 1981 Act, therefore. the
legislature declared that such lands as had been filled
prior to the effective date of the Submerged Lands Act were
"substantially valueless for trust uses" and could be
disposed of without impairing the public trust in the
remaining lands (282). The legislature believed that the
public would benefit by a clarification of the title status
of such filled lands, "thereby permitting [their) full use
and d eve lop men t ( 283 ) .
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Prior to the law's enactment, the Maine Supreme
Judicial Court rendered an advisory opinion upholding these
legislative findings and declaring the statute
constitutional (284). The court stated that giving up the
public rights in the filled lands was "reasonable for the
benefit of the people" as required to withstand
constitutional challenge, based upon a unique combination of
legislative and Judicial findings (285). Besides deciding
that the legislature might reach the conclusions stated in
the Act (286), the Court found that clearing title to the
lands so commercial and other activity could proceed without
legal reservation was a "legitimate and important pUblic
pur p 0 5 e . " (287)
Since the law would prevent disruption of the state's
economy, the court believed the public as a whole was
benefited (288). Moreover, the court relied on the
legislative finding that municipalities, which depend on the
filled lands for part of their tax base, could not afford to
lose this source of revenue (289). The legislative
conclusion that there was insufficient documentation to
determine the former high and low water marks along Maine's
coast so as to evidence the state's claims was also
important to the court (290)' The court declared that the
legislature could conclude that a case-by-case resolution of
the status of the filled lands would be expensive, time
consuming and impractical (291). Although some of the
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filled submerged lands might be useful for wharves and other
coastal facilities, the court decided the legislature could
reasonably conclude that the public's need ror the
facilities was not substantial enough to Justify leaving the
title to all of Maine's coastally filled land in limbo
(292 >.
The court believed that equity Justi~ied confirming the
expectation of private ownership by private parties who had
long relied upon their title to the filled lands, and in the
~unicipalities that had taxed those lands (293), Finally,
the court noted that by releasing its title to the filled
lands, the state had not lost any of its broad authority to
regulate their development through zoning and other devices
(294) .
As might be expected, some people Characterized the
1981 enactment as "the greatest giveaway in the state's
history," and predict it forecasts the death of public trust
law in Maine (295), Despite these doomsdayers, the statute
has yet to be challenged, and apparently is achieving its
purpose of clearing the clouded title to many former
tidally-affected lands .
As matters now stand, anyone who filled tidelands or
submerged lands on or before October 1, 1976. or their
successor in title, owns the filled land outright, unless
they were filled since 1967 without the requisite approval
of municipality under the Wetlands Control Act (296). Those
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who built wharves or other structures over lands that have
remained submerged (that is, one hundred rod lands and
seaward) prior to October L 1976, or those who filled in
violation of the Wetlands Control Act prior to this date
have a no-cost easement to use the land which expires in
year 2005 (297). After that it seems they will have to
negotiate leases for the lands under their structures or
fill, if the erections and fill are allowed to remain, as is
currently contemplated (298)' This lease arrangement
distresses some of the affected wharf owners, who claim they
have paid taxes on the lands underlying their structures for
years, and believe they own the lands (299)' As a result of
their lease status and its uncertainties, a number of owners
are unwilling to expend money ror improvements to their
fa c iii tie s (300 ) .
The title of riparian landowners to the tidelands
abutting their property beneath wharves and structures seems
unaffected by the recent legislation. Since 1975, however,
it is apparently impossible to have acquired private title
to one hundred rod lands or submerged lands, and perhaps
even to tidal flats, by virtue of filling these .l a n d s or
whal' fin g 0 u t 0 v e r the m ( 301 ) . Ins tea d,onemu s t 0 b t a ina
lease to these lands under the Submerged Lands Act before
commencing the bUilding or filling activity. As of 1983 the
going price for most such leases was three cents a square
foot, although the state is empowered to charge a fee based
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on the appraised value of the property (302).
COMPARISON OF STATES' LEGAL TREATMENT OF TIDELANDS DEVELOPMENT
It is striking how similar the evolution ~f tidelands
law has been in New Jersev, Massachusetts and Maine. Like
social and economic considerations in the Northeast
apparently produced like treatment of tidelands.
The progression of tidelands law in these three states
can be divided into three stages . In the first stage,
private development proliferated without regulation. as the
young states attempted to establish a foothold in national
and international commerce. During the second stage, the
states began to regulate tidelands development, as their
major harbors became crowded and difficult to navigate
because af enormous private expansion into the states'
tidewaters . In the last and current stage. more rigorous
tidelands legislation is being introduced, as coastal zone
preservation has become increasingly important, and the
states are trying to sort out who owns what. Each of these
stages will be examined in mare detail, with the
similarities among. and differences between the state's
activities in each stage being compared .
The first stage began in colonial times and continued
through the mid-nineteenth centur~, as riparian owners in
all three states appropriated the tidelands adJoining their
uplands for their own private use.
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In Massachusetts and
Maine, the result primarily was achieved by means of a
regional colonial enactment (303) which later was integrated
into larger common law of the two states (304) . In New
Jersey the law evolved in the opposite direction. There the
common law custom of allowing private tideland expansion was
later codified in 1851 (305).
The allowance for the expansion of private claims into
tidelands reflected the commercial needs of a growing
nation. Money was required to finance waterfront
development: such structures as wharves, piers and
warehouses (306). What better way to achieve the investment
of private capital than to make it attractive by allowing
for the private acquisition of land? In Massachusetts and
Maine, the area of private appropriation was limited to
tidal flats (307), while in New Jersey the riparian owner
could develop down to the low water mark (308)-
In all three states, private development of the
relevant tidelands prior to the mid-1800's gave the
developer and his sUCCessors a preferential right to those
lands. New Jersey citizens who artificially appropriated
tidelands prior to 1869 or 1891 received clear title to the
lands in perpetuity (309). In Massachusetts and Maine,
dlthough the riparian owners' rights in the tidal flats were
qualified prior to development by the pUblic rights of
fishing, fowling and navigation (310), to the extent that
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these flats were filled prior to the imposition of state
regulation, it appears that the public trust was
extinguished (311). It can be argued that the publi~ rights
remain in those flats over which structures were erected,
since it still is possible to fish. fowl and navigate the
underlying waters .
In New Jersey, where riparian landowners had not
improved the adjacent tidelands prior to the imposition of
development regulations in 1869 and 1891, the license to
gain title by artificially appropriating these lands Was
revoked (312). Riparian owners in Massachusetts and Maine
still retain this right, SUbJect to permitting requirements
(313)'
Licensing requirements are the hallmark of entry into
the second stage of the development of tidelands law. In
the three states examined, the second stage spanned the
mid-1800's to around the 1960's. Harbor traffic was booming
by the mid-nineteenth century (314), and the unregulated
expansion of wharves into the hanbors impeded commercial
traffic . The filling of tidelands further reduced naVigable
harbor space. Thus all three states instituted a permitting
regime; New Jersey's (315) and Massachusett's (316)
requirements applied to all tidelands development, while
Maine's only applied to the erection of wharves and weirs
(317).
In each of the three states either a specialized
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board's, or else the town's permission was required before
the relevant tideland development could occur. In New
Jersey (318) and M~ssachusetts (319) the licensing process
became a potentially profitable venture because of the
various fees imposed, although this was not the case in
Maine.
The New Jersey approach was to create a group of
Riparian Commissioners, which, in addition to licensing
tideland development, leased and sold the tidelands which
were to be developed to private parties (320). This process
began in 1869 in some areas, and in 1891 along the remainder
of the coast (321).
In Massachusetts. a similar authorization scheme was
instituted in 1866, with the Board of Harbor Commissioners'
permission being required before tidelands were improved
(322), SubseQ.uent enactments in the 1860's and 1870's made
it clear, though, that Massachusetts was not planning on
using the New Jersy method of selling its tidelands.
Instead, Massachusetts designed a leasing arrangement. Any
development license issued after 1869 was made revocable at
the instance of the legislature (323), so it was impossible
to attain a vested development right. In addition, a fee
structure was imposed so th~t ~ny private party which
proposed to displace tidal water in its improvement scheme
had to pay a tidewater displacement fee (324)' An
additional charge was levied if commonwealth tidelands were
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being developed (325).
Maine began requiring licenses for wharf and weir
erection in 1876 (326) . Besides being less comprehensive in
its coverage than the New Jersey and Massachusetts
enactments, the Maine law required no lease or purchase of
the lands underlying the proposed structures prior to 1975,
even if state tidelands were involved . The 1975 Submerged
Lands" Act provided for the lease of lands beneath both
existing and proposed tideland developments (327).
Even more interest~ngly, Maine apparently did not see
the need to regUlate the filling of its tidelands until 1967
(328), by Which 't i me its counterparts had been managing
tideland fill for over fifty years. This difference in the
treatment of tideland filling perhaps can be attributed to
the less industrialized nature of Maine. Whatever the
reason, Maine was still achieving the second stage
innovations while New Jersey was struggling into the third
stage of the tideland law progression.
The third stage was stimulated by the increasing
awareness of the unique and irreplaceable qualities of
tidelands which began in the 1960's . It is at this stage
that there has been substantial digression between the three
states' treatment of tideland development . The states are
similar in that by this time each has strict permitting
re~uirements which must be complied with before any
development can occur below the high water mark
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(329)---whether the improvement be the erection of a small
residential dock or the filling of acres of tidelands for a
condominium complex. And all three states have decided to
retain their interest in illegally developed tidelands which
are still SUbject to the tidal flow (330)-- such tidelands
as those underlying improperly built wharves . The
difference among the states is in their treatment of
tidelands filled wi t hou t the appropriate governmental
permission during the second stage of the tideland law
progression.
The third phase reached New ~ersey first when, in 1959,
the state claimed privately developed meadowlands (331),
Despite several ensuing proposals to release illegally.
filled tidelands of long standing to their purported' private
owners (332), it was not until 1981 that a coherent approach
to the tidelands problem evidenced itself. Prior to 1981
the state Department of Environmental Protection
unilaterally had embarked upon its own attempt to map all of
the state's tidelands under the auspices of a legislative
mandate to map New ~ersey's meadowlands (333), After the
passage of the 1981 constitutional amendment (334) and the
promulgation of subsequent court decisions interpreting it
(335), it was clear that New Jersey had decided to claim as
much of its illegally filled tidelands as it could in a
limited period of time (336)' The state then would sell
those tidelands to their present occupants (337) .
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Massachusetts. in contrast, continued no-sale policy or
its second phase of tideland law development into the third .
Although its legislature seriously considered extinguishing
the public's interest in illegally filled tidelands. so that
purported private owners would hold title in fee simple
absolute (338)) the legislature instead decided to continue
a combined licensing-leasing approach (339). Thus the
commonwealth intends to charge for the use of its unlawfully
filled tidelands as i~ they had been lawfully developed
(340), Massachusetts has yet clearly to establish the
ownership status of either its legally or illegally
developed tidelands.
Maine was the only one of the three northeastern states
examined which not only considered releasing the state's
rights in illegally filled tidelands to their purported
private owners, but actually did so (341) , It is somewhat
surprising that this action has yet to be challenged in
Maine's courts, since this approach was SUfficiently charged
politically for the other two states to reject it. The next
section of this paper will discuss such recurrent overtones
which arise in balancing the public and private interests in
illegally developed tidelands.
RECURRENT THEMES IN TIDELAND DEVELOPMENT LAW
The overriding concern of the three states examined
herein when dealing with the tideland ownership issue is
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clearing title to the land (342). Now that state tideland
claims are being publicized. no potential buyer of tidelands
will purchase the property if there is a possible state
interest in the land (343) . Lack of marketable title
results in political activity by the purported private
owners, which eventually concludes with legislative action .
Thus two of the three states studied, the third being
Massachusetts, have clarified the title issue.
The political nature of the decision-making process
concerning how to treat illegally developed tidelands is
apparent from the raft of tideland proposals the states
considered before adopting their current s c h ame s (344)' The
decision is made more explosive by the inherent conflict
which exists between the expectations of private riparian
owners and the public rights involved. Often private
shorefront owners developed their adjacent tidelands in good
faith, without knowledge that a state license was required.
And even if the developers themselves did not act in good
faith, they frequently sold to unsuspecting buyers who never
dreamed they were purchasing illegally filled tidelands
(345) .
Balanced against these private expectations are the
public rights in tidelands which date back to colonial times
(346)' It seems unJust fair that the public at large should
give up its interest in valuable tidelands for the benefit
of a fortunately placed few . The public rights are
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especially significant now that the amount of publicly held
coastal lands has dwindled, and the importance of this tidal
buffer between the land and sea and biological breeding
ground has been recognized (347).
Nevertheless, it is understandable that ·the purported
private owners of developed tidelands feel preJudiced by
virtue of the fact that the states have waited 50 long to
consider asserting their claims against the private
landholders. If another private party held legal title to
the tidelands instead of the state, the doctrine of adverse
possession would operate to extinguish the original owner's
right for failure to assert it within a reasonable period of
time <348>' Adverse possession, and other e~uitable
theories, however, generally do not operate against the
state (349), especially where the state is holding the
public's interest in trust (350)' The general theory is
that the price of allowing the state, by inaction, to divest
the public of its interest in favor of a private party is
too high.
The more intangible public benefits which are lost if
the state decided to release its interest in illegally
filled tidelands is not all that has to be considered. The
monetary issues have to be factored into the decision as
we 11 . The financial considerations are especially important
in the case of New Jersey, where tideland revenues
constitutionally have been dedicated to the support of the
public schools since 1844 (351) .
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If New ~ersey legislators
and its citizenry had approved the proposed constitutional
amendment extinguishing all of the state's interest in
illegally filled tidelands of long standing (352), the
school fund would have lost a substantial chunk of money.
Since no state grants would have been required to clear
title to these lands, no purchase monies would have been
forthcoming.
Whether the State of New Jersey, on balance, has gained
Dr lost money by deciding to claim title to its filled
tidelands in unclear. It must have been very costly to map
the state's possibly filled tidelands. publish the results
of the study (353), as well as now process grant
applications and litigate contested claims (354) . One
wonders whether the state might nct be taking money cut of
the Department of Environmental Protection's pocket and
putting it in the public school fund's pocket. Even New
Jersey has limits on the revenues it can spend on tideland
claims, as is evidenced by its decision not to pursue claims
against private landholders unconcerned with clearing the
title to their property (355) .
The costs of asserting the state's claims to unlawfully
filled tidelands also played a major role in the development
of tideland strategy in Massachusetts and Maine. Although
Massachusetts has not resolved its tideland issue totally,
it has decided not to pursue its claims against already
PAGE 52
existing illegal tideland development (356), Instead. it
will wait for the developers to come to the state under its
new permitting procedure (357).
In Maine. the ba 'lancing of monetary costs and benefits
was even mOTe evident than in New Jersy or Massachusetts.
Thus Maine's highest court declared that its legislature
"reasonably could conclude that case-by-case resolution of
the existing problem--whether by legislative.
administrative, or Judicial action--would be costly.
time-consuming. and ineffective" (358)' especially taking
into account the fact that the municipalities who have
relied on thE.> filled lands as part of their tax base "can
'i l l afford to lose, or be thrown into extended litigation
over. those established sources of revenue." (359)
Although Maine and New Jersey decided to resolve their
tideland problems in apparently opposite fashions, with
Maine releasing its public rights and New Jersey asserting
its public rights. both approaches were characterized by
their opponents as "giveaways." (360)' This criticism was
levied because neither state chose to assert its rights to
illegally filled tidelands in perpetuity. without recourse
for the purported private owner. Massachusetts has avoided
this condemnation. probably because it has yet to reach a
final decision as to who owns its improperly filled
tidelands. The reasonableness of this Massachusetts
approach. when compared with the conclusiveness of New
PAGE 53
Jersey's and Maine's tidelands treatment will be discused in
the next section .
RECOMMENDATIONS FOR STATUTORY TREATMENT OF TIDELAND DEVELOPMENT
From the foregoing study of the statutory schemes in
the three states there apparently is little question that
these states have retained (361), and should continue to
retain, their interest in those tidelands still subject to
the tidal flow, whether or not the tidelands support
privately-erected structures. Anyone buying a private
structure located upon these lands is on notice that the
underlying property consists of tidelands, and therefore is
possi~ly subJect to state claims.
More worthy of examination is the best statutory
approach to the ownership of illegally filled tidelands.
Two prerequisites of an ideal scheme are that it
conclusively establishes ownership rights in the tidelands,
and that it attains a balance between the expectations of
private holders of illegally filled tidelands and the
public's interest.
The enactment which comports most fully with both of
these requirements is New Jersey's tideland law. New
Jersey's statutory scheme reaffirms the state's interest in
illegally filled tidelands, while allowing private "owners"
an opportunity to obtain clear title to their filled
tidelands (362). Moreover, the New Jersey legi5lati~n was
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the subject of a voter reFerendum (363), a must even for a
nonconstitutional issue because of the magnitude of the
public interest at stake.
New ~ersey's tideland approach can be improved upon,
however. For i nstanc 8, th e rate of c ompensa"t i on a pr i vate
party must pay to extinguish the state's interest in "his"
land should be mandated by legislative enactment in order to
ensure evenhanded treatment of all riparian owners (364).
Moreover, a special expedited and inexpensive appeals
process shOUld be established for tideland claims so private
parties can contest the designation of their lands in a
rapid and inexpensive hearing (365). The appeals process
should not be 50 onerous that it is cheaper and easier to
pay the state to clear one's title than to contest the
property's designation . The ensuing discussion will explore
the ramifications of this proposal for the disposition of
illegally filled tidelands.
Since one of the primary factors responsible for the
enactment of statutes to untangle tideland ownership status
is to clarify title claims, an important requirement for a
:uccessful scheme is that it conclusively address the
ownersh i P issue. The New ~ersey and Maine legislation
clearly resolves this question, but the Massachusetts
legislation enacted to date lacks the predictable quality
(366) .
While the leasing approach of the Massachusetts
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legislation is initially appealing because it does not
alienate the lands from the public, a leasing scheme without
a resolution of the title issue does not resolve anything.
All it does is postpone until the end of the lease term the
inevitable decision of what to do regarding tidelands title.
The alternatives to leasing are to give or sell the
tidelands to their purported private owners, or eJect the
current private landholders in favor of the state. The last
choice is overly harsh, as it ignores the fact that most
private owners do not know they hold illegally filled
tidelands (367), Moreover the approach would enrich the
state unjustly through the acqUisition of overlying land and
buildings for which it did not pay, a major consideration
since some of the prime downtown real estate in such port
cities as Boston and Portland consist of illegally filled
tidelands (368). Finally, the public interest which the
state is supposedly protecting has been extinguished in
these lands. at least in the traditional sense. No
navigation, fishing or waterfowling can take place on filled
tidelands.
Extinguishing the public interest in illegally filled
tidelands without any compensation to the state swings too
far towards the opposite extreme. Using an approach similar
to Maine's results in marginal public benefits at best;
clear title for a relatively few landholders, continued tax
revenues to municipalities. and savings in time and money
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since the state's claims do not have to be identifiied
<369> . Private landholders stand to reap the greatest
benefit under such a scheme, gaining clear title. while the
public loses an invaluable. although certainly altered,
resource without any recompense. The
maintenance-of-town-tax-revenues arguement hardly seems a
convincing reason for giving away state lands. As for the
fact that the identification of state claims is an expensive
and time-consuming process, this is a given . Nevertheless.
it is a task that is necessary for any comprehensive coastal
resource management scheme. Lack of past enforcement of
tidelands law is no excuse for giving up current tideland
claims. In making the choice to identify these lands.
however, the cost of the proJect should be acknowledged.
The only option left is the New Jersey approach : to
assert the state's tideland claims, allowing good faith
landholders to purchase grants from the state if it is
determined that their land consists of unlawfUlly filled
tidelands (370) . No time limit should be set on the mapping
process as long as the affected tidelands are identified
within a reasonable time. There is no need to impose New
Jersey's referendum-inspired arti~icial cutof~ upon an
idealized statute (371).
A presumption should be established that unless it can
be shown that a private property holder filled the tidelands
he claims himself, or that the tidelands were filled within
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the past ten to fifteen years by someone else, he is a ngood
Ta i t h n 1an d hoI de r ( 372 ) . This des i 9nat ion wi 11 en tit 1e the
landholder to obtain clear title to his illegally filled
tidelands at a legislatively mandated percentage of the
property's fair market value, not taking into account any
privately-erected improvements thereon. The state will be
required to convey title to him at the mandated price in
order to facilitate similar treatment of persons in like
situations . If, however, a private party is not a "good
faith" landholder, the state will have the option of whether
to sell him a grant, and if so, at what price.
Any money from the state tideland grants will go into
the state coffers, thus benefiting the public at least
marginally and offsetting the costs of asserting state
claims. Thus the public will be compensated somewhat for
the alienation of its interest, while good faith landholders
will not be taxed excessively.
It may be desirable to impose a time limit within which
a private landholder has to clear title to his property.
after which full title will be held by the state. As a
result, at some point in time, the title issue will be
completely resolved. The period allowed the property holder
to obtain a grant should be relatively long, e. g.
seventy-five years, so that he has sufficient time to raise
any portion of the purchase price he lacks.
In addition, an expedited, ine lCpensive hearing or
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appeals process should be established so that landholders
can challenge the designation of their property as illegally
filled tidelands. This process might avoid the incongruous
results of the New Jersey scheme, where apparently it is
cheaper and easier to pay the state to clear a potentially
clouded title than to challenge a questionable state claim
(373). Abuse of the hearing process can be avoided by
allowing for the assessment of the state's court costs and
attorney fees against a private challenger if the hearings
officer determines the private party brought a frivolous
claim.
Finally, because of the widespread effect any decision
by the state to give away. sell or retain illegally fi :lled
tidelands in which the state may have an interest, any
proposal for these lands should be put before the electorate
for vote . The ramifications of disposing of the state's
tideland interests are too great to leave this issue to
legislators subJect to partisan influence.
CONCLUSION
It is obvious that the three northeastern states
investigated in this study have decided on different
statutory treatments of illegally filled tidelands. There
is no one correct res~lution of the tidelands issue,
although an idealized approach has been set forth in this
paper. Rather, each state must balance the competing public
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~nd private interests in the state's tidelands, after taking
into account the state's own historic treatment of
tidelands. Then the state can determine its own best
solution to the issues raised by illegally developed
tidelands.
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the state a nonrefundable $694,000 over one disputed acre of
land, and agreed to pay a total of $4.6 million if the state
suported its claim in court . Wall St. J. J Oct. 11, 1982,
a~ 23. The state never made a claim, but as provided in the
agreement, retained the $694,000 . 1JL.
(98) Moore, supra note 55, at 76.
(99) Dickinson LlL supra note 57. 469 A.2d at 6.
(100) Dickinson !L supra note 51. 454 A.2d at 494.
( 101) Moore, supra note 55, at 76.
( 102) Di c k i nson .L.... supra note 51, 454 A. 2d at 496.
(103) Die k in50n .!.L.... supra note 57. 469 A.2d at 7.
( 104) .!iL...., 469 A. 2d at 3, 7 (quat i ng N. J. Canst. of
1947 art . VIII; sec. v , para . 1, as amended Nov. 3,
1981>. The language of the amendment. in full. is as
follows:
No lands that were formerly tidal
flowed, but which have not been tidal
flowed at any time for a period of 40
years, shall be deemed riparian lands,
or lands subject to a riparian claim.
and the passage of that period shall
be a good and sufficient bar to any
such claim. unless during that period
the State has specifically defined and
asserted such a claim pursuant to law.
This section shall apply to lands which
have not been tidal flowed at an~ time
during the 40 years immediately preceding
adoption of this amendment with respect
to any claim not specifically defined
and asserted by the State within 1 year
of the adoption of this adm·endment .
N. J . Canst. of 1947 art. VIII, sec. Vi para. 1. as
amend ed Nov. 3, 1981).
(105) Dickinson IlL supra note 57. 469 A.2d at 3. 7
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(c it i ng N. J. Canst. of 1947 art. VI 11. sec. v , para. 1,
as amended Nov. 3. 1981>' In an attempt to generate the
state governer's support. the original amendment was revised
to allow for the one year grace period. Moore, supra note
55, at 76.
(106) Dickinson ~ supra note 57, 469 A.2d at 6-7.
(107) !JL.....
(108) Dickinson LL supra note 51, 454 A.2d at 495.
(109) See i.!L.... Since N. J . Stat. Ann. sec. 13:
lE-13.5 (West 1979), allowing for administrative and
Judicial review of state tideland claims, was promulgated
solely for the meadowlands, it may not be applicable to
other tidelands. See Dickinson l.!..L supra note 57, 469 A.2d
at 6; LeCompte x; state. 128 N. J. Super . 552, 320 A.2d
876, 881 (1974) . After O'Neill, housever. it is clear that
an upland owner can institute a ~uiet title suit against the
state without specific statutory authority . See 235 A.2d at
5.
(110) N. J. Stat . Ann. sec. 12: 3-4 (West 1979); as
modified by the reorganization of state governemnt reflected
i n iJL.... at 5 e C . 13: 1D-1.
(111) Dickinson ~ supra note 57, 469 A.2d at 7;
St. J.} Oct. 11. 1982, at 23, 30.
( 112) Die kin s on .!..L... sup ran 0 t e 57, 469 A. 2 d a t 7.
Wall
(113) Dickinson ~ supra note 51. 454 A.2d at 496. Some
people believed that the amendment would give away a
priceless asset of the state and its educational system, as
well as Jeopardize the credi~ rating of school bonds secured
by monies received from riparian grants and leases. Wall
St. J.} Oct. 11, 1982, at 23, 30. Environmetalists who
opposed the amendment thought the constitutional changes
would threaten the management of tideland development. ~
(114) Dickinson .!....L supra note 51, 454 A.2d at 496.
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(115) GormlelJ v . Han, 88 N. J. 26, 438 A.2d 519 (1981).
The Supreme Court held the interpretive statement worded by
the Attorney General was unfair, and suggested a different
statement for use. 1.L
(116) Dickinson ~ Fund for the Support of
Schools, 187 N. J. Super. 320, 454 A.2d 480
r e v r d , 187 N. J. Super. 224, A.2d 491 CAppo
rev'd, 95 N.J. 65, 469A.2d 1 (1983) .
Free Fublic
CLaw Div . ),
Di v. 1982),
(117) Dickinson ~ supra note 51, 454 A.2d at 496. The
vote was 864,445 for, and 756,220 against approval. l.!L..
C118) N. J. Canst.
1, as amend ed Nov. 3,
of 1947 art .
1981.
VI I I, sec. v , para.
(119) Wall St. J., Oct. 11, 1982, at 23. About thirty
percent of the state's area was being :i n v e s t i g a t e d for
potential claims. l.!L..
(120) Dickinson l!L supra note 57, 469 A.2d at 9.
(121) See ~ at 8.
(122) N. Y. Times. oc t. 23, at 29. 30.
(123) Dickinson .!..!.L supra note 57, 469 A.2d at 10-11.
The state utilized the mapping procedure it had been
required to use when making meadowlands claims in asserting
all of its valid tideland claims. 1.L at 8. It thus met
the specific deliniation requirement of the amendment by
designating the places where the tide had flowed on more
generalized maps of the areas investigated ror tidal claims.
~ at 11. The assertion re~uirement was met by filing the
maps bearing tidal designations with the Secretary of State
and county and municipal clerks. ~
(124) N. Y. Times, Oct, 23, 1982, at 29, 30.
(125) Dickinson ~ supra note 57, 469 A.2d at 10-11.
The state did not meet the specific deliniation requirement
for the Delaware tidal region when it submitted maps of
areas suspected of possibly containing tidelands, without
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designating a line of tidal flow. 1JL... Nor did the state
really believe it had met the amendment's mandate in filing
these maps, according to the trial testimony of both the
Attorney General and the chairman of the Tidelands Resource
Caunc i 1. .!JL.... at 10.
(126) lJL..... at 14.
(127) See Moore, supra note 55. at 76.
(128) See .i.!:L-
(129) Wall St . J ., Oct. 1 L 1982, at 23, 30.
(130) Editorial. N. Y. Times. Oct. 30, 1982, at 26, col.
1. According to a New York Times editorial, 224 claims were
settled during the ten year span, with the average cost to
the homeowner being $1,722. l.!L...
(131) N. Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1982, at 53, col. 1; N. Y.
Times, Oct. 24, 1982, sec. 11, at 1. This view probably
stemmed from a New Jersey appellate court decision which
held that the compensation a riparian owner should pay for a
tidelands grant was the fair market value of the property.
See LeCompte ~ State, 128 N. J. Super. 552, 320 A.2d 876,
881 (1974>' In LeCompte, a riparian owner who had filled
tidelands while his grant application was pending was
charged the fair market value of the tideland property at
the tim e 0 f con v e y a nee. 1..!L.. a t 878, 881. Sin c e h e had
already improved lands at the time of the conveyance, having
~illed them in, subdivided them, installed water lines.
sewer systems and roads. he was charged the fair market
value of the property in its improved state. ~
(132) See Moore,
7, 1982, at 53. col.
29, col. 5.
supra note 55, at 76; N.Y.
1; N. Y. Times, Dc t. 23,
Times, Nov.
1982, at
(133) Wall St .
Editorial. N. Y.
J., Oct.
Times, Oct.
11,
30.
1982, at 23, 30. Contra
1982, at 26, col. 1.
(134) Duffy,
Or t . 1 1, 1982,
supra note 96, at 95.
at 23 .
See Wall St. .J . ,
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(135) Moore, ~~ note 55, at 76;
1982. at 53. col. 1.
N. Y. Times, Nov. 7.
(136) N.Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1982, sec . 11. at 1.
proposed amendment would have added a second paragraph
the New Jersey Constitution of 1947 art VIII, sec. v.
N. J. Stat . Ann. Canst . art VIII, sec. v , annat. 2
(West Supp 1983-1984).
The
to
See
( 137) N. Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1982, sec. 11. at 1.
(138) Moore, supra note 55, at 76 .
N. Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1982, sec. 11. at 1.
(140) DUffy, supra note 96. at 96.
(141) N. Y. Times, Oct. 24, 1982, sec . 11. at 1.
(142) N. Y. Times, Nov . 7, 1982, at 53, col. 1. The
vote was 990, 161 against and 627,088 in favor of the
amendment. .!lL-.
( 143) N. Y.
( 144) 1JL....
Times, Nov . 7, 1982, a t 53, co!. 1.
(145) Telephone interview with Joann Cubberley, New
Jersey Tidelands Resource Council (June 7, 1984) .
(146) !L
1.
(147) See, L!L-' N. Y. Times, Nov. 7, 1982, at 53, col.
( 148) Di c: k i nson 1L supra note 51, 454 A. 2d at 504. See
also Dickinson ~ supra note 57, 469 A.2d at 5 n.3.
(149) Di c k i nson 1L supra note 51, 454 A. 2d at 504 .
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(150) Telephone interview with Joann Cubberley, supra
note 145.
(151) N. J.
1984-1985) .
Stat. Ann. sec . 13: 1E-13 (West Supp.
(152) Telephone interview with Joann Cubberley, supra
note 145. In order to give approval of a grant or lease
application under ·N.J. Stat . Ann . ·s e c . 13: 1E-13.9
(West 1979), the Tidelands Resource Council must be
satisfied that the grant or lease is in the public interest,
including in its calculations the environmental impact of
the proposed use . ~ Since this statute was part of the
meadowlands enactments, it is arguable that it does not
apply to nonmeadowlands . See Dickinson l.L.... supra note 57,
469 A.2d at 6; LeCompte Y..:.... State, 128 N.,J . Super. 552,
320 A.2d 876, 881 (1974). If it does not, the proper
standard of review for riparian lands which are not
meadowlands would be an earlier statute whicb is still in
effect. N. J. Stat. Ann. sec. 12: 3-10 <West 1979> only
requires the Council to consider the effect of the action on
navigation. ~ The Tidelands Resource Council apparently
is the relevant granting authority for the latter statute,
as well. See P. L. 1919, ch. 233, sec. 3, p . 568, as
modified by P. L. 1945, ch . 22. sec. 29, as repealed by
P. L. 1979, c h . 386, sec. 4. The reader is rererred by
N. J. Stat. Ann. sec. 13: lA-29 (West Supp. 1983-84) to
i..!L.. at sec. 13: 18-13 (West Supp 1984-1985), where
reference is made to the Tidelands Resource Council.
('153) Telephone interview with Joann Cubberley, supra
note 145. N. J. Stat. Ann. sec. 13: 1'8-13.9 <West 1979)
directs the Tidelands Resource Council, in fixing the price
to be charged for a lease or conveyance of lands owned by
the state, to take into consideration "the actions of a
claimant under' color of title who in good faith made
improvements or paid taxes, or both, on the lands in
question." ~ Although this statute arguably applies only
to meadowlands, and not to all tidelands, Dickinson !.L...
supra note 57, 469 A.2d at 6; LeCompte x; State, 128 N. J.
Super. 552, 320 A.2d 876, 881 (1974), it seems to be the
guide currently used by the Council . This is logical since
the older statutory directive concerning the setting of the
consideration paid for tidelands is less specific ("such
compensation ... as shall be determined by the b o e r d "} and
does not contemplate the possibility of good faith
landholders of filled tidelands attempting to clear tideland
title. See N. J. Stat . Ann. sec. 12: 3-10 (West 1979)
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(154) Telephone interview with ~oann Cubberley, supra
note 145.
( 155) N. Y.
St. J ., OCt.
Times, Oct. 23, 1982, at 29, col.
11, 1982, at 23, 30.
5; Wall
(156) Dickinson .!.l.L supra note 57, 469 A.2d at 13 n. 14
(157) Telephone interview with ~oann Cubberley, supra
note 145.
( 158) N.~. Canst. of 1947 art VI I 1. sec. i v , para. 2.
(159) See N. Y. Times, Oct . 24, 1982, sec . 11. at 1,
col. 5. As of 1982. the interest from the Fund comprised
only a few million of the two billion dollars New ~ersey
spent annually on the school aid . ~
(160) Supra notes 101-107 and 117-126 and accompanying
te x t .
(161) If the property had been tidelands within the past
forty years, under the 1981 constitutional amendment any
state claim to the land would not be precluded until forty
yeaT'S afteT' the land attained its nontidal state . See N.~.
Canst. of 1947 art. VII. sec . 5, para. 1. as amended
Nov. 3 I 1981 ; sup ran 0 tel 04.
(162) SupT'a notes 147-154 and accompanying text.
(163) Supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
(164) Ward Sand and Materials Co. ~ Palmer, 51 N.~.
51, 237 A.2d 619. 624 (1968). Where tidelands had been
reclaimed under the authority of the Wharf Act of 1851, but
subsequently were ro e i n un da t e d for over fifty years, the
reasonable time allowed a private owner to reexclude the
tide had long since lapsed. ~ Title to the land vested
in the state. !.L
(165) See sup~a note 49 and accompanying text.
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(i66) See Universit.y of Mainel supra note 181 at 188.
(167) Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp . ~ Commonwealth.
378 Mass . 629. 633, 393 N. E. 2d 356 (1979>. The companies
received "absolute propert~ in the land within the limits or
the charter," as well as "full dominion over all the ports,
rivers, creeks, and havens. and in as full and ample a
manner as they were before held by the Crown of England . II
Commonwealth L Charlestown, 18 Mass. (1 Pick .) 180, 182
(1822) .
( 168) Boston
378 Mass . 629,
Commonwealth ~
(1851) .
Waterfront Dev . Corp. ~ Commonwealth,
633-34, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979). See also
Alger, 61 Mass. (7 Cush.) 53, 65-66
(169) Eoston Waterfront Dev. Corp. ~ Commonwealth,
378 Mass . 6291 634, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979>'
( 170) .!lL-;
<t1e. 1981).
Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 605
(171) See supra note 34.
(172) See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
(173) Colony Ordinance of 1641-47. ch. LXIII. sec . 2,
Ancient Charters and Laws of the Colony and Province of
Massachusetts Bay 148 (1814 ed.) (cited in University of
Maine supra note 18, at 189) (hereinafter cited as Colony
Ordinance of 1641-47). Section 3 of the ordinance provides:
It is declared, that in all creeks, coves
and other places about and upon salt water,
where the sea ebbs and flows, the p r-o pr i e t or-.
or the land adJoining, shall have propriety to
the low water mark, where the sea doth not ebb
above a hundred rods, and not more wheresoever
it ebbs further :
Provided, that such proprieter
this liberty have power to stop or
pa ssage of boats or other vessels,
any sea, creeks or coves, to other
or lands.
shall not by
hinder the
in or through
men's houses
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~ ~ also Boston Wate~f~ont Dev. Corp. ~
Commonwealth, 378 Mass. 629, 635-36, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979);
Opinion of the -Ju s t t c e s , 437 A.2d 597,605 (Me. 1981>.
( 174) See Co 1 any Ord i nanc e of 1641-471 supra note 1731 at
ch. LXIII, sees. 2-3. Section 2 provides:
Every inhabitant who is an householder
shall have free fishing and fowling in any
great ponds, bays, coves and riversl so far
as the sea ebbs and flows within the precincts
of the town, or the general court, have other-
wise appropriated them:
P~ovided, that no town shall appropriate
to any particular person or persons, any
great pond, containing more than ten acres of
land. and that no man shall come upon another's
prop~iety without thei~ leave, otherwise than
as hereafte~ expressed .
~ See also Opinion q£ the Justices. 365 Mass .
N. E. 2d 561, 566 (1974); Commonwealth Y..:... Alger.
(7 Cush.) 53, 67-79 (1851>.
6811 313
61 Mass.
(175) Easton Waterfront Dev. Corp. ~ Commonwealth.
378 Mass. 629, 637, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979).
(~76) See Opinion of the Justices iR the Senate, 424
N. E . 2d 1092, 1099 (Mass. 1981>; Commonwealth ~ Alger, 61
r1ass. (7 Cush.) 53, 79 (1851).
(177) Opinion of the Justices ~ the Senate, 424 N.E. 2d
1092, 1099 (Mass. 1981); Commonwealth ~ Alger, 61 Mass .
(7 Cush. ) 53, 74-75 <1851>.
(178) See Commonwealth ~ Alger. 61 Mass .
76-77 (1851).
(7 Cush. ) 53,
(179) ~ Although the Colonial Ordinance was enacted in
the Massachusetts Bay Colony, it was adopted by common law
throughout the rest oT the Province of Massachusetts. ~
at 76.
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(180) Boston Waterfront Dev . Corp. x; Commonwealth,
378 Mass. 629, 640, 393 N.E.2d 356 (1979).
-
( 181> 1J!.:.-.
Bradfol'd ~
(1902) .
at 637-38 (and statutes cited therein);
McQuesten. 18 Mass. 80, 82, 64 N. E. 688, 689
(182) See Commonwealth ~ Alger, 61 Mass.
72 {1851>.
(7 C u s h . ) 53,
(183) Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp . ~ Commonwealth,
378 Mass. 629,640,393 N.E.2d 356 (1979).
(18:tlJ l.!L (citing St. 1866,
(current version at Mass. Ann.
(Michie/Law Co-op. 1975».
ch. 149,
Laws ch .
sec. 4,).
91. sec . 20
(185) St.
Laws ch. 91.
1859, ch. 223 (current version at Mass .
sec. 2 (Michie/Law Co-op. 1975»,
Ann.
(la6) Commissioner ££ Public Works ~ Cities Servo Oil
Co .• 308 Mass. 349, 32 N. E . 2d 277, 281 (1941> (citing St.
1866. ch. 149, sec. 4) (current version at Mass. Ann.
Laws ch. 91, sec . 21 (Michie/Law Co-op. Supp . 1984» .
( 187) Mass .
Co-op 1975).
Ann. Laws c h . 91, sec. 21 {Michie/Law.
(188) See ~, where all cases cited in the annotation
deal with monetary compensation .
( 189) St.
Mass. Ann.
1975) ) .
1866, ch .
Laws ch.
149, sec. 5 (current version at
91, sec. 23 (Michie/Law. Co-op.
(190) Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. ~ Commonwealth.
378 Mass. 629.640,393 N.E.2d 356 (1979); Commissioner of
Public Works ~ Cities Servo Oil Co .• 308 Mass . 349, 32
N. E. 2d 277, 280 {1941> (both citing St. 1869, ch. 432,
sec. 1) (current version at Mass. Ann. Laws c h , 91. sec.
15 (Michie/Law. Co-op Supp . 1984) >.
(191) St. 1869, c h .
Mass . Ann. Laws ch .
Supp. 1984».
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432, sec. 1 (current version at
91, sec. 15 (Mich ie/Law. Co-op
(192) Commissioner of Public Works ~ Cities Servo Oil
Co., 308 Mass. 349, 32 N. E. 2d 277, 281 (1941) (citing St.
1874, c h . 284, sec. 1) (current version at Mass. Ann.
Laws c n, 91. sec. 22 (Michie/Law. Co-op . Supp . 1984) .
(193) For the definition of one hundred rod lands. ~
supra text following note 34.
(194) Telephone interview with Bill Lahey, Esq.,
Massachusetts Executive Office of Environmental Affairs
( J u n e 7, 1984 ) .
(195) Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. L Commonwealth.
378 Mass. 629, 630, 637, 393 N. E. 2d 356 (1979) (citing St.
1832, ch. 102).
(196) Boston Waterfront Dev. Corp. L
378 Mass. 629. 641. 393 N. E. 2d 356 (1979)
therein).
Commonweal th,
(and cases cited
( 197) 378 Ma 5 5 . 629, 393 N. E. 2d 356 (1979).
( 198) !.L at 646-49.
( 199) !..!L.... at 649.
(200) !.L
(201) Black's Law Dictionary 266 (5th ed. 1979) .
(202) Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424 N. E. 2d
1092, 1099 (J1ass. 1981) .
(203) Accord ~ at 1098.
(204) !..!L.... at 1098, 1099.
(205) See ~ at 1099j
(7 Cush . ) 53, 79 (18:51).
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Commonwealth ~ Alger, 61 Mass.
(206) See Answer ~ the Justices 1R the Senate, 415
t~. E. 2d 170 01ass. 1980).
(207) Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d
1092, 1098 (Mass. 1981) (citing S. No. 1001). See also
Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424 N.E.2d 1111
(Mass. 1981> (advi sory op ini on on similar b i 11, H. No.
658) .
(208) Opinion Q£ the Justices ~ the Senate, 424 N.E. 2d
1092, 1098 (Mass. 1981).
(209) ~ at 1102. Although the court believed that the
proposal directing how instruments were to b"e construed was
proper, it did not think it would release the Commonwealth's
interest in the submerged land involved in the Boston
Waterfront case. l.fL.... at 1102. In the court's opinion the
commonwealth's interest in the Boston Waterfront property
stemmed not by implication from legislation, but from the
legislature's failure to make a complete grant of the
commonwealth's and the public's interest in the land. ~
(210) See ~ at 1110 (Liacos and Abrams, JJ.,
dissenting) .
(211) ~ at 1102-03. The court concluded that the
vestigial interest of the commonwealth could be properly
el iminated. ~ at 1103.
(212) See ~ at 1103.
(213) See id. at 1110 (Liacos and Abrams, JJ.,
dissenting) .
(214) ~ at 1103-05. The majority of the court
con c Lud edthis provis ion con s tit uti 0 n a 1. l!L... a t 11 04. The
majority believed that a public trust interest of the ·t y p e
involved in the Boston Waterfront case could properly be
considered for release in the manner described in the bill .
.!JL...-
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(215) ~ at 1106-07.
(216) Act of Dec. 17, 1983, c h , 589, with emergency
preamble, 1983 Mass. Adv. Legis. Serv o 139 (Law. Coop.
(relevant sections codified at Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 91,
sees. 1-24 (Michie/Law Coop. Supp. 1984».
(217) Telephone interview with Bill Lahey, EsQ..,
note 194. See Mass . Ann. Laws c h. 91, sec. 18
(Michie/Law. Coop. Supp . 1984).
supra
(218) Telephone interview with Bill Lahey, EsQ.., supra
note 194 . See St. 1956, ch. 528.
(219) Mass. Ann. Laws ch. 91, sees. 1, 18
(Michie/Law. Coop. Supp. 1984). The Department of
Environmental Quality, as well as the Department of
Environmental Management, are the successors of the Board of
Harbor Commissioners charged with protecting· the
commonwealth's tidelands. See!..fL.... at sec. 1 (the end
result of St . 1919, c h , 350, sec. 113, as amended by St.
1931, ch. 394, sec . 49, as amended by St. 1975, c h , 706,
sees. 123, 312, as amended by St. 1983, c h , 589, sec.
20) .
(220) Mass.
Coop. Supp.
(221) lfL....
Ann.
1980) .
Laws ch. 91, sec. 18 (M i chi e /Law.
(222) 1JL... at sec. 1.
(223) lfL....
(224) l.!L..
(225) 1JL... at sees. 14, 18. These findings relate to
the development's contribution to the pUblic interest and
its compliance with other state programs. 1JL... at sec. 18.
(226) l.Q..... at sec. 14.
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(227) See supra notes 175-176, 196, and accompanying
te xt.
(228) See supra notes 197-203 and accompanying text .
(229) See supra notes 190-191 and accompanying text.
(230) .!lL...
(231) 1JL...
(232) See supra note 189 and accompanying text.
(233) Telephone interview with Bill Lahey. Esq., supra
note 194.
(234) l.!:L....
(235) l.!:L.... See supra notes 219-221 and accompanying text.
(236) Telephone interview with Bill Lahey, "Es q . , supra
note 194. For a discussion of these assessments, see supra
notes 185-188 and 192 and accompanying text, as well as the
statutes cited therein.
(237) University of Maine, supra note IB, at 306. The
Massachusetts Legislature agreed to the separation on ~une
19, 1819, and the United State Congress voted to admit Maine
to the Union blJ an enactment dated March 3, 1820. !.!L.... at
306 and nn . 3-4. (citing Gen . Laws of Mass . 1799-1822,
Acts and Laws, 1819, c h , 36. ch. 162 and 3 U. S. Stat.
544, en. 19 (1820».
(238) University of Maine. supra note 18, at 187.
(239) Barrows ~ McDermott, 73 Me. 441, 448 (1882).
(240) State ~ Wilson, 42 Me. 2, 26-27 (1856).
(241) 'Ma r s h a l l Yo:- Walker. 93 Me.
( 1900) .
532, 536. 45 A.
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497
(242) State ~ Wilson, 42 Me. 2, 26-27 (1856)
(243) See Colon~ Ordinance of 1641-47. supra note 173. at
ch. LXIII. sec . 3.
(244) See Me . Rev. Stat. Ann . tit . 12. sec. 559 (2)
( D ) (1 98 1 ) . The r e "5 U b mer 9 e d 1and" i s d e fin edt 0 inc 1 u d e
th e one hundred rod land s , .!JL...
(245) See supra notes 19-20 and accompan~ing text.
(246) See University of Maine. supra note 18. at 317.
This authorization would have to be given by the state
legislature or its delegate . .!JL...
(247) !J:L- at 314.
(248) Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597. 598-99 (Me.
1981 >.
(249) Whitmore ~ Brown. 102 Me.
C1906).
47. 65 A. 516, 520
(250) University of Maine, supra note 18, at 295. A
fishing weir is a fixed structure constructed of posts
s u r r o u n d e d by brush or netting which is designed to catch
fish. See Me . Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 38, sec . 1021
( 1978).
(251 r Whitmore x., Brown, 102 Me. 47. 65 A. 516. 520
(1906) (citing Me. Rev. St. ch. 4. sees. 96-99) ;
University of Maine, supra note 18. at 295 and n , 249
(citing P. L. 1876, ch . 78). (current version at Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann . tit . 38, sec . 1022 (1978) >. See also
Blaney -c: Rittall. 312 A.2d 522. 528 (Me . 1973)
(252) !.!L-
(253) WhitmorE' L Brown, 102 Me.
( 1906).
(254) l.fL...-
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47, 65 A. 2d 516, 520
(255) Morrison, SubmerQed Lands : Public or Private
Ownership?, Com. Fisheries News, Aug. 1983, at 30.
(256) See infra notes 239-42 and accompanying text.
(257) See infra notes 245-46 and accompanying text.
(258) Opinion Q£ the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 599 (Me.
1981)
(259) Blaney y..:.... Rittall. 312 A.2d 522. 528 (Me. 1973) .
(260) ~ (citing Me.
4701 (repealed 1975) >.
Rev. Stat . Ann . ti t . 12, sec .
(261) Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. ti t. 38, sec. 472 (1978).
(262) .!JL.... at sec. 471.
(263) ld. at sec.
Servo ch. 453. s s c .
474. as amended by 1983 Me.
5.
Legis .
(264) Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 599 (Me.
1981 i .
(265) .!JL....
(266) lfL..) Morrison, supra note 255, at 30.
(267) Me .
( 1981 ) .
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, sec. 5013
(268) "Submerged land" later was defined as "all land
affected by the tides seaward of the natural
or 100 rods from the natural high watermark,
close to natural high watermark ." Me. Rev .
tit'. 12, sec. 559 (2) <D) (1981>
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low watermark
whichever is
Stat. Ann.
(269) "Intertidal l an d " later was defined as "all land
affected by the tides below natural high watermark and
either 100 rods seaward therefrom or the natural low
watermark, whichever is closer to the natural high
watermark," .ilL. at sec. 559 (2) (13L that is, the tidal
flats. See supra note 34 and accompanying text.
(270) Me.
(1981)
Rev. Stat. Ann. ti t. 12, sec. 558 (2) (A)
(271) l.f!..:-
597, 599 (Me.
See also Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d
1981) .
(272) Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, Sec. 558 (2) (E)
(1981). The fish landing and processing operations granted
no-cost easements could not occupy more than two thousand
square feet of state tidelands. !Jt..... at sec. 558 (2) (B)
(3) .
(273) 1JL.... at sec. 558 (3).
Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 599 (Me.
note 255, at 30.
See also Opinion g£ the
1981 ) ; M0 r r i son. 5 u D r a
(274) Me.
( 1981 ) .
Rev . Stat. Ann. tit. 12, sec. 559 (2) fB)
(275) Compare Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. S-E!C. 559 (2) (a>
(1"981) with Colony Ordinance of 1641-47, supra note 173, at
c h . LXIII, sec. 3. For the statutory definition of
"intertidal land," see supra note 269.
(276) See Morrison, supra no~e 255, at 30.
(277) Ll!......
(278) See Me.
( 1981 ) .
Rev . stat : Ann. ti t. 12, sec. 559
(279) !.fL.- at sec . 559 (3) .
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(280) Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 605 and n.4
(Me. 1981>' See Me. Rev. Stat . Ann. tit. 12, sec.
559 (7) ( ·1981> .
(281) Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 606 (Me.
1981) .
(282) Me.
( 1981 ) .
(283) .i!L....
Rev. Stat. Ann . ti t . 12, sec. 559 (1)
(284) See Opinion of the Justices> 437 A.2d 597 (Me.
1981). The Maine court relied heavily upon the advisory
opinion of the Massachusetts Supreme Judicial Court
concerning a similar bill, ~ at 607-611. which is
discused supra notes 207-215 and accompanying text.
(285) Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 607, 609
(Me. 1981>.
(286) ~ at 608.
(287)
.i!L.... at 607.
(288) l.f!.:.-
(289) l.!L...
(290) 1l!..:.- at 607-08.
(291) l..!L.- at 608.
(292) l.fL-
(293) l!L..
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(294) ~ at 608-09 .
(295) Morrison, supra note 25:5, at 30.
(296) Me. Rev. Stat. Ann. tit. 12, sec.
See supra notes 279-80 and accompanying text .
559 (1981) .
(297) Me . Rev. Stat. ·An n . tit. 12, sec. 558 (1981> .
See supra notes 2'71-74 and accompanying text. Amendments to
the permitting statute for wharves and weirs, which were
passed in 1975, specifically provided that any license for
such a structure "does not confer any right, title or
interest in submerged or intertidal lands owned by the
State." P. L. 1975, th. 287, sec. 2 (codified at Me.
Rev. Stat. Ann. tit . 38. sec. 1022 (1978>'
(298) See Me.
( 1978).
Rev. Stat. Ann . ti t. 12, sec . 558
(299) See Morrison, supra note 255, at 30.
(300) .!.fL-.
(301) It is possible that Me. Rev. Stat . Ann . tit.
12, sec . 558 (1981) will be interpreted as a repeal of the
Colonial Ordinance of 1641-47, and a reassertion of the
state's interest in tidal flats not yet appropriated by
riparian owners. If so, shorefront landowners will no
longer be able to obtain title to the adJacent tidal flats
by filling these lands.
(302) See Morrison, supra note 255, at 30.
(303) See supra notes 170-74 and accompanying tex t.
(~04) See supra notes 179 and 239 and accompanying text.
(305) See supra notes 39-44 and accompan~ing te xt.
(306) See supra note 169 and accompanying tex t .
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(307) See supra notes 170-73 and 239-40 and accompanying
tex t.
(308) See supra notes 40-41 and accompanying text.
(309) See supra notes 45-47 and accompanying text.
(310) See supra notes 174, 177 and 240-41 and
accompanying text.
(311) See supra notes 175-76 and 242 and accompanying
tex t.
(312) See supra note 48 and accompanying text.
(313) See supra tex·t following notes 230 and 300 .
(314) See supra Commonwealth ~ Alger. 61 Mass.
7) 53, 72 (1851.>'
(Cush .
(315) See supra note 49 and accompanying tex t.
(316) See supra note 184 and accompanying tex t .
(317) See supra notes 251-254 and accompanying text.
(318) See supra note 50 and accompanying text .
(319) See supra notes 186-88 and 192 and accompanying
te xt.
(320) See supra notes 49-50 and accompanying tex t.
(321) See supra notes 45-46 and 49 and acco~panying tex t .
(322) See supra note 184 and accompanying tex t .
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(323) See supra notes 190-91 and accompanying text .
(324) See supra notes 186-B8 and accompanying text.
(325) See supra note 19~ and accompanying text.
(326) See supra notes 251-52 and accompanying text.
(327) See supra notes 270-73 and accompanying text .
(328) See supra notes 259-60 and accompanying text.
(329) See supra notes 49, 184, 189, 217-26, 251-54 and
259-63 and accompanying text.
(330) See supra notes 163~65, 229, 231-32, 297 and 301
and accompanying text.
(331) See supra notes 61-64 and accompanying text.
(332) See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
(333) See supra note 93 and accompanying text.
(334) See supra notes 103-07 and 117 and accompanying
text.
(335) See supra notes 120-21 and accompanying text.
(336) See supra notes 122-26 and accompanying text.
(337) See supra notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
(338) See supra notes 211-12 and accompanying text.
(339) See supra notes 216-17 and accompanying text .
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(340) See 5up~a note 236 and accompanying text.
(341) See supra note 279 and accompanying text.
(342) See sup~a notes 66-67, 99-101, 205-07 and 279-83
and accompanying text.
(343) See supra notes 134, 147 and 283 and accompanying
tell t.
(344) See sup~a notes 67-79, 117-18, 206-07, 216, 267-70
and 278-80 and accompanying text.
(345) See supra notes 99-100 and 293 and accompanying
te x t.
(346) See supra notes 19-20 and accompanying text .
(347) See The Water's Edge, sup~a note I. at 6-16.
'( 3 4 8 ) See generally R. Powell and P. Rohan, Powell Q.!l
Real Property sees. 1012-1026 (abr. 1968).
(349) See, e. g. , ~
Owner's Dilemma, pt. 1
at sec. 1020; Porro,
supra note 66. at 15-16.
Meadowlands
(350) See, ~. Sax, supra note 76 at 478-89.
(351) See supra notes 56-57 and accompanying text .
(352) See supra notes 70-76 and accompanying text.
(353) See supra notes 79-83, 93 and 120-23 and
accompanying text .
(354) See supra notes 147-52 and accompanying text.
(355) See supra note 146 and accompanying text .
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(356) See supra note 234 and accompanying text.
(357) See supra note 235 and accompanying text.
(358) Opinion of the Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 608 (Me.
1981) .
(359) ~ at 607.
(360) See supra notes 113 and 295 and accompanying text .
(361) See supra notes 163-65, 229, 231-32, 297 and 301
and accompanying text .
(362) See supra notes 147-54 and 161-62 and accompanying
te x t.
(363) See supra note 112 and accompanying text.
(364) In contrast, New Jersey's compensation rate
apparently has been administratively set. See supra notes
150-54 and accompanying text.
(365) In New Jersey, it is surprising that there are 50
few challenges to state tidelands claims, considering the
probabilit~ of success in such a proceeding. See supra
notes 148-49 and accompanying text. The only apparent
explanation ror the lack of claims contests is the
burdensome nature of the appeal, since no appeals process is
provided other than the standard ~uiet title suit. See ~
(366) See supra text accompanying notes 334~41.
(367) See, e. g., supra notes 99-100 and 293 and
accompanying text.
(368) See Opinion of the Justices to the Senate, 424
N. E. 2d 1092, 1096, 1109 app. A (Mass. 1981)J Opinion Qf. the
Justices, 437 A.2d 597, 599 (Me. 1981 >.
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(369) See supra notes 285-94 and accompanying text.
(370) See supra notes 147-54 and 161-62 and accompanying
te xt.
(371) See supra notes 117-18 and accompanying text.
(372) If the landholder filled the tidelands himself, in
violation of the statute, he obviously is not a "good faith"
property holder . Similarly, since public awareness of the
issue of illegally filled tidelands has been high during the
past decade or more, any potential purchaser of recently
filled tidelands should have been on notice to investigate
the land's true status.
(373) See supra note 365.
